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NOTES AND COMMENTS
seems to be a major defeat for public health and consumer interest. Cigar-
ette-cancer plaintiff's were moving toward favorable verdicts under im-
plied warranty, but the act apparently nullifies their chances. Future plain-
tiffs will be faced with the obstacle of notice on cigarette packages re-
sulting in assumption of risk. The tobacco industry has apparently evaded
liability under an implied warranty and saved millions of dollars by the
enactment of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
Harmon B. Allen
CRIMINAL LAW: INADM.SSABLE CoNFnsSIoNS
A system of criminal law enforcement which
comes to depend on the "confession" is less
reliable and more subject to abuses than a
system which depends on extrinsic evidence
secured through skillful investigation.
This statement by Mister Justice Goldberg in the now famous case
of Escobedo v. Illinois' expresses the philosophy of recent court decisions
in cases involving questionable confessions. The rule of the Escobedo
case (that if the investigation has reached the accusatory stage and the
defendant has been denied assistance of counsel, his confessions then
made are inadmissible) 2 has been modified and reinterpreted by two re-
cent California cases.
In People v. Schader3, the defendents entered a grocery store in the
late evening, each stepping into a separate checkout line. Upon reaching
the cashier, defendant Turner demanded all the money in the cash register
and after he receivd it, both dfendants left the store. An off-duty police
officer saw the two performing the robbery and attempted to stop them
outside the store. Defendant Schader got behind the officer, placed his
pistol to the officer's neck, and fired, killing him instantly. The defendants
were later apprehended while attempting to leave town. Later that same
evening both defendants made confessions which were duly recorded. De-
fendants were convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, defendant
Schader attacked the confession alleging he had not been informed of his
right to counsel. The court reversed the conviction and in its opinion said:
"Mf he [Defendant] did not request counsel his confession still remained
inadmissible ... since the record does not indicate that the defendant,
prior to his confession, had been advised of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent or had otherwise waived those rights."
In the Schader opinion the court cited another California case, People
1 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964). (Footnotes omitted.)
2 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
a 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 401 P.2d 665 (1965).
4 Id., at 199, 401 P.2d at 671.
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v. Dorado, in which a similar situation had arisen. Dorado was a prison
inmate and was accused of stabbing to death a fellow inmate. Defendant
was interrogated three different times and was never informed of his
right to counsel or his right to remain silent. During the second interro-
gation the defendant confessed to the crime and gave details concerning
its perpetration. The court did not admit the confession and in its opinion
quoted Escobedo stating: '"here is necessarily a direct relationship be-
tween the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a con-
fession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for
legal advice:4 The court is referring to the accusatory stage of the process
or where it "... . has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of inter-
rogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.... ."7 In
Escobedo the court determined that if this stage had been reached and the
defendant was denied counsel, any confession thereafter made by him
whether voluntary or involuntary would be inadmissible. In fact the court
held that "no statement" elicited from the defendant under these circum-
stances would be admissible.
In Dorado the court took this rule from Escobedo and went one step
further, stating:
[D]efendants confession could not properly be introduced
into evidence because (1) the investigation was no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun
to focus on a particular suspect, (2) the suspect was in
custody, (3) the authorities had carried out a process of
interrogations that lent itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, (4) the authorities had not effectively informed
defendant of his right to counsel or of his absolute right
to remain silent, and no evidence establishes that he had
waived these rights.8
By expanding the Escobedo rule and holding that defendant must
be advised of his right to counsel and the absolute right to remain silent
the court reversed the long standing California rule, that voluntary con-
fessions made in the absence of warnings as to rights of counsel and the
right to remain silent could be admitted into evidence.0
The decision in Escobedo, followed by Schader and Dorado, stresses
the importance of the theory that counsel should be present during the
interrogation to assure that defendants rights will be protected.10 This
5 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 1763 (1965).
6 Id., at 175, 398 P.2d at 367. (Emphasis by court.)
7 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 1, at 490-91.
8 People v. Dorado, sapra note 5, at 179, 398 P.2d at 371. (Emphasis
added.)
. 9 People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal. 2d 306, 125 P.2d 29 (1942); People v. Ramirez,
113 Cal. App. 204, 298 P. 60 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); People v. Booth, 72 Cal.
App. 160, 236 P. 987 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925); People v. Clark, 28 Cal. App. 735,
153 P. 980 (Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
10 Note, The Right to Counsel During Police Investigation, 25 MD. L. Ray.
165, 175 (1965).
[Vol 3, No. I
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 3 [1966], Iss. 1, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol3/iss1/14
NOTES AND COMMENTS
is a sound proposition but was first propounded in Escobedo where the
defendant was actively denied counsel The California courts have made
a liberal interpretation of the general rule as stated in Escobedo and held
that police officers and prosecutors must inform the defendant that he
may be represented by counsel at these interrogations. It would seem obvi-
ous that the number of confessions obtained from suspects would be
greatly reduced under these circumstances.
Before the adoption of this viewpoint the courts placed great em-
phasis on whether the confession was voluntary or involuntary."1 However,
it has been noted that this test in the future may not be sufficient to de-
cide questions of due process.'2 Justice Burke in his dissent in Schader
stated: "[T]he prejudice which results from the use of an improperly re-
ceived voluntary confession is not necessarily the same as that which
the Supreme Court of the United States has held to result from the use
of an involuntary confession."'13
The majority of the court, however, felt that the voluntariness of the
confession was less important than the defendant's right to counsel, or
was subservient to his right to counsel.14 Therefore, the court has deter-
mined that it is not as important for the defendant to have confessed of
his own free will as it is to assure that his rights are not violated by al-
lowing him to confess, or encouraging him to confess, without first in-
forming him of his right to be represented by counsel at interrogations.
Thus the emphasis is shifting to guaranteeing individual rights under the
constitution as construed by the courts, and confessions improperly ob-
tained are no longer admissible into evidence no matter how truthful or
reliable.' 5 The merits of this shift are not to be determined here.
Early Oklahoma decisions held that the object of admitting a con-
fession in evidence is to obtain truth. The courts felt the only ground
upon which a confession should be rejected is that the circumstances under
which it is obtained tend to show that it may be false, and therefore the
object is likely to be frustrated.' 6 The Oklahoma appellate courts have
made no rulings on the specific subject of the admissibility of a confes-
sion after failing to advise an accused of his right to counsel, except in a
case involving a minor seventeen years of age. The court ruled his con-
fession inadmissible when, in the absence of parent, guardian or counsel,
he was not advised of his constitutional right to refuse to answer ques-
tions that might incriminate him.'7 In other cases involving this closely
11 People v. Siemsen, 153 Cal. 387, 95 P. 863 (1908).
12 Criminal Law, 9 WAYNE L REV. 62, 67 (1962).
13 People v. Schader, supra note 3, at 204, P.2d at 676 (dissent). (Em-
phasis by court).
14 People v. Schader, supra note 3.
15 Mamone, Right to Counsel on Arrests: A Federal Exclusionary Rule Against
Confessions and Admissions Illegally obtained in State Prosecutions, 16 W. RES.
L REv. 725,779 (1965).16 Guthrie v. State, 87 Okla. Cr. 112, 194 P.2d 895 (1948); Carr v. State,
85 Okla. Cr. 429, 188 P.2d 705 (1948); Schrack v. State, 84 Okla. Cr. 260, 181
P.2d 270 (1947).
17 Fields v. State, 77 Okla. Cr. 1,138 P.2d 124 (1943).
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